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GLOBAL EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION

"Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives"

April 27 - 30, 2010 Fort Walton Beach, FL

Agenda

Wednesday, April 27, 2010

Welcome Remarks

• Mr. Jim O'Neil, Deputy Vice Chairman, NDIA EOD Planning Committee; Executive Director, EOD Memorial Foundation

Keynote Remarks - The Three Dimensional EOD Warrior - Defense, Diplomacy and Development

 Colonel Leo Bradley, USA, Chief EOD & HMA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities

NATO EOD Working Group Update

• Wing Commander James P. Brudenell, Air Force of the United Kingdom Explosive Ordnance Disposal Working Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Science and Technology for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices

• Dr. Ruth Doherty, Program Executive Officer for Counter IED, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Irregular Warfare

• Mr. David Johnson, Executive Director, Center for Advanced Defense Studies

Interagency Combating Terrorism Technology Support

Mr. Gabriel Ramos, Deputy Director for Technology, Department of Defense Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, Office of the Secretary of
Defense

Interagency Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

Dr. Edwin A. Bundy, Program Manager, EOD/Low-Intensity Conflict, Department of Defense Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, Office
of the Secretary of Defense

Thursday, April 29, 2010

Keynote Remarks - Building Collaborations in Countering IEDs

• Mr. Jim W. Blackburn, Assistant Capability Manager Engagement, European Defense Agency

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Support of the EOD Force

• Mr. Michael Barry, Explosive Ordnance Specialist, DTRA Combating Terrorism Division

SERVICES STATE OF THE UNION ON EOD

- Navy Commander Eugene Rathgeber, USN, EODGRUONE, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
- Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Marc Tarter, USMC, EOD Action Officer/Occ Sponsor, Office of the Director, Logistics Plans, Policies and Strategic Mobility, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
- Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Laurie Richter, USAF, EOD Program Director, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force A4/7

EOD Training Panel

• Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey LaCaze, USA, Director, U.S. Army EOD Land Warfare Center of Excellence

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Friday, April 30, 2010

Coalition Joint Task Force Troy (Iraq) Efforts to Defeat Explosive Ordnance and Improvised Explosive Devices

• Colonel Patrick J. Kelly, USA, Commander, 71st Ordnance Group EOD

Ground Forces Panel

• Colonel Thomas J. Langowski, USA, 52d OD GP EOD

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Directorate Brief

• SGM Frey



GLOBAL EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

Conference and Exhibition

"Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives"



LOCATION

Emerald Coast Conference Center 1250 Miracle Strip Parkway SE Fort Walton Beach, FL 32548

ATTIRE

Appropriate dress for the conference is business coat & tie for civilians and Class A uniform or uniform of the day for military personnel.

ID BADGES

During conference registration and check-in, each attendee will be issued an identification badge. Please be prepared to present a valid picture ID. Badges must be worn at all conference functions.

PROCEEDINGS

Conference proceedings will be available online approximately two weeks after the event. You will receive an e-mail notification once the proceedings are available for viewing.

SPEAKER DONATION

In lieu of Speaker gifts, a donation has been made to the EOD Memorial Foundation.

CONTACTS

Ms. Mary Anna Christiansen Meeting Planner **NDIA** (703) 247-2596 mchristiansen@ndia.org

Ms. Alden Davidson, CEM Associate Director of Exhibits **NDIA** (703) 247-2582 adavidson@ndia.org

Global Explosive Ordnance Disposal Conference and Exhibition

April 27 - 30, 2010 Emerald Coast Conference Center, Fort Walton Beach, Florida

"Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives"

Tuesday, April 27

12:00 - 6:30 PM Conference Registration

5:00 - 6:30 PM**Opening Reception in Exhibit Hall**

Wednesday, April 28

7:00 - 6:30 PM Conference Registration

8:00 - 8:30 AM Welcome Remarks

> Mr. Eugene Squires, Chairman, NDIA EOD Planning Committee; Senior Partner, Squires & Fulcher, LLC Management Consultants

Mr. Jim O'Neil, Deputy Vice Chairman, NDIA EOD Planning Committee; Executive Director, EOD

Memorial Foundation

8:30 - 9:15 AM Keynote Remarks – The Three Dimensional

EOD Warrior - Defense, Diplomacy and

Development

Colonel Leo Bradley, USA, Chief EOD & HMA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict &

Interdependent Capabilities

9:15 - 10:00 AM NATO EOD Working Group Update

> Wing Commander James P. Brudenell, Air Force of the United KingdomExplosive Ordnance Disposal Working Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO)

10:00 - 10:30 AM Networking Break in Exhibit Hall

So Who is the "Pointy End of The Spear" Today? 10:30 – 11:15 AM

Mr. Gary Motsek, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and

Logistics)

11:15 – 12:00 PM	Science and Technology for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices Dr. Ruth Doherty, Program Executive Officer for Counter IED, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
12:00 – 1:30 PM	Networking Lunch in Exhibit Hall
1:30 – 2:15 PM	Improvised Explosive Devices – Strategic Weapons of Influence for Irregular Warfare Colonel Karl Reinhard, USA, Executive Officer to the Director, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
2:15 – 3:00 PM	Irregular Warfare Mr. David Johnson, Executive Director, Center for Advanced Defense Studies
3:00 – 3:30 PM	Networking Break in Exhibit Hall
3:30 – 4:00 PM	Interagency Combating Terrorism Technology Support Mr. Gabriel Ramos, Deputy Director for Technology, Department of Defense Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense
4:00 – 4:30 PM	Interagency Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Dr. Edwin A. Bundy, Program Manager, EOD/Low-Intensity Conflict, Department of Defense Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense
4:30 – 5:00 PM	Interagency Irregular Warfare Support Mr. Richard Higgins, Program Manager, Irregular Warfare Support, Department of Defense Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense
5:00 – 6:30 PM	Reception in Exhibit Hall

Thursday, April 29

7:00 – 8:00 AM	Continental Breakfast in Exhibit Hall
7:00 – 5:00 PM	Conference Registration
8:00 – 8:15 AM	Welcome Remarks Lieutenant General Donald Wetekam, USAF (Ret), Group Vice President, Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul, AAR Corporation
8:15 – 9:00 AM	Keynote Remarks – Building Collaborations in Countering IEDs Mr. Jim W. Blackburn, Assistant Capability Manager Engagement, European Defense Agency
9:00 – 9:45 AM	EOD's Vital Role in Protecting the Force Rear Admiral Archer M. Macy, Jr., USN, Director, Joint Integrated Air & Missile Defense Organization, Deputy Director for Force Protection, J-8, The Joint Staff
9:45 – 10:15 AM	Networking Break in Exhibit Hall
10:15 – 11:00 AM	Defense Threat Reduction Agency Support of the EOD Force Mr. Michael Barry, Explosive Ordnance Specialist, DTRA Combating Terrorism Division

11:00 – 3:00 PM	SERVICES STATE OF THE UNION ON EOD
11:00 – 11:45 AM	Army Brigadier General Ernest C. Audino, USA, Director, G-33 Current Operations, HQDA ODCS G-3/5/7
11:45 – 12:30 PM	Navy Commander Eugene Rathgeber, USN, EODGRUONE, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
12:30 – 1:30 PM	Networking Lunch in Exhibit Hall
1:30 – 2:15 PM	Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Marc Tarter, USMC, EOD Action Officer/Occ Sponsor, Office of the Director, Logistics Plans, Policies and Strategic Mobility, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
2:15 – 3:00 PM	Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Laurie Richter, USAF, EOD Program Director, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force A4/7
3:00 – 3:30 PM	Networking Break in Exhibit Hall (Last Chance to View Exhibits)
	SIMULTANEOUS BREAKOUT PANELS
3:30 – 5:00 PM	BREAKOUT PANEL (LOCATION: GENERAL SESSION ROOM) Joint and Coalition Operations Panel Moderator – Colonel Leo Bradley, USA, Chief EOD & HMA, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities - Warrant Officer Quentin Paske, Air Force of Australia - Warrant Officer Class 2 Matt Tanner, Army of Australia Wing Commander James Brudenell, Air Force of United Kingdom - Lieutenant Colonel Leland Browning, USA, US Head of Delegation for NATO EOD
3:30 – 4:15 PM	BREAKOUT PANEL (LOCATION: ISLAND ROOM) EOD Training Panel Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey LaCaze, USA, Director, U.S. Army EOD Land Warfare Center of Excellence
4:15 – 5:00 PM	BREAKOUT PANEL (LOCATION: ISLAND ROOM) EOD Technology Panel Major D. Landon Phillips, USAF, Chairman, EOD Military Technical Acceptance Board Officer in Charge, USAF Detachment 63, NAVEODTECHDIV
5:00 PM	Adjourn for the Day

Friday, April 30

7:00 – 8:00 AM	Continental Breakfast in Foyer
7:00 – 12:00 PM	Conference Registration
8:00 – 8:15 AM	Welcome Remarks Mr. Jim O'Neil, Deputy Vice Chairman, NDIA EOD Planning Committee; Executive Director, EOD Memorial Foundation
8:15 – 9:00 AM	Keynote Remarks – Coalition Joint Task Force Paladin (Afghanistan) Efforts to Defeat Explosive Ordnance and Improvised Explosive Devices Command Sergeant Major Randall Hefner, USA, CSM, CJTF-Paladin
9:00 – 9:30 AM	Coalition Joint Task Force Troy (Iraq) Efforts to Defeat Explosive Ordnance and Improvised Explosive Devices Colonel Patrick J. Kelly, USA, Commander, 71st Ordnance Group EOD
9:30 – 10:00 AM	Networking Break in Foyer
	SIMULTANEOUS BREAKOUT PANELS
10:00 – 12:00 PM	GROUND FORCES PANEL (LOCATION: GENERAL SESSION ROOM)
	Moderator – Major General Walt Davis, USA, Deputy Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center, Training & Doctrine Command - Colonel Thomas J. Langowski, USA, 52d OD GP EOD - Colonel Patrick J. Kelly, USA, 71st OD GP EOD - Lieutenant Colonel Walt Romine, USMC, Marine Forces Command: EOD Officer - Master Gunnery Sergeant, Michael Todd, USMC, HQMC, EOD MOS Manager - Command Sergeant Major Randall Hefner, USA, CSM, CJTF-Paladin
10:00 – 12:00 PM	NAVAL AND AIR FORCE PANEL (LOCATION: SUNSET ROOM)
	Naval Forces Moderator – Mr. Ken Falke, Chairman, A-T Solutions, Inc Commodore Theodore Lucas, USN, EODGRU ONE - Commodore Dale G. Fleck, USN, EODGRU TWO
	Air Forces Moderator – Mr. Dan Tompkins, Safety Officer, ECC - Lieutenant Colonel Tim Bongiovi, USAF, Commander, 23 CES/CC - Major Joshua Tyler, USAF, NAF CE Officer - Chief Master Sergeant (Select) James Brewster, USAF, 4 CES Flight Superintendent - Chief Master Sergeant Robert Hodges, USAF, EOD Career Field Manager - Chief Master Sergeant Jerry Shelton, USAF, AFCENT EOD Functional Manager
12:00 PM	Conference Adjourns

DTRA's Support to the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Community

29 April 2010

Emerald Coast Conference Center Fort Walton Beach, FL



Making the world safer





Agenda

- What and who is DTRA?
 - Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
 - Small Arms & Light Weapons (SALW)
- Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
- IED Attack and Defeat Cycles
- The IED Threat: Persistent and Evolving
- Commonalities & Differences between High Explosive (HE) and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) type devices
- How DTRA Become Involved with IEDs
- DTRA Support to the EOD Community
- DTRA's Ongoing IED related R&D technology projects



Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DTRA

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is a combat support agency of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Founded in 1998, the agency headquarters is located in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. DTRA employs 2,000 men and women, both military and civilian, at more than 14 locations around the world.

DTRA's Mission

To safeguard the United States and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives (CBRNE)) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat and mitigate its effects.

UNCLASSIFIED



Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)

CTR's non-proliferation effort reaches across the European, Central, and Pacific Commands' AORs – and may possibly expand to other Commands – to eliminate, secure and interdict nuclear, chemical and biological materials that could be used against the United States, its partners, allies, and friends.







OSD Policy establishes guidance and coordinates necessary agreements for all CTR activities.

DTRA is the implementing agent; responsible for all aspects of program, contract, and funding management.



CTR Program Areas

Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination



Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security



Biological Threat Reduction Program



WMD Proliferation Prevention







Small Arms & Light Weapons

- Small arms: weapons designed for personal use:
 - Revolvers, rifles, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, LMGs
- Light weapons: designated for use by several persons serving as a crew:
 - Mortars (< 100mm), crew served MGs, Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), recoilless rifles, crew-served grenade launchers, man-portable rocket/missile systems/anti-tank guns
- Ammunition and Explosives:
 - Small Arms Ammunition for small arms), shells and missiles for light weapons, all grenades, landmines, explosives





What is an IED?

- IED: An explosive device used in an unconventional manner by terrorist, guerrilla, criminal, or commando forces
 - Design: from crude to very sophisticated
 - CAN include explosive material OR chemical, biological or radiological payloads
 - Only limited by the imagination of the builder
 - Size, shape, container, lethality, initiators/triggers



Radio Controlled IED



Suicide Bomber Vest




Improvised Rocket Launcher



Vehicle IED VBIED



- Components
 - Container
 - Power source
 - Switch
 - Initiator
 - Main charge





- For a few years, the single largest cause of U.S./Coalition casualties
- Use by Jihadists has steadily increased over the last 7 years
 - Used in a large number of attacks on coalition forces
 - Specifically targeting critical forces:
 - First Responders
 - EOD
- The breadth of use has expanded since their first appearance in Iraq in 2003





IEDs – An Evolving Threat

- Explosives are readily available to terrorists, including advanced explosive charges
- Advanced sensor and remote detonation technologies
- There are multiple arming and firing systems











Commonalties & Differences

IEDs

WMD Dispersal Devices

Safe Separation

Arming

Arming

Firing

Firing





- Can Often Blow-in-Place
- Current TTPs



CBRN

- Can NEVER BIP
- Modified TTPs
- MUST Render Safe





How DTRA Became Involved in IEDs

- Commands requested DTRA assistance
- DTRA Liaison Officer deployed to OIF
- Delivered first equipment shipment
- Delivered additional shipments
- Maintained Liaison Officer presence in theater
- Currently supporting Allied forces on WMD matters



Phase I – COTS Solution

- Provided modified Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) technologies directly to deployed OEF/OIF forces
- Delivered new EOD support tools into theater (over 2700 items)
- Proved concept for X-ray backscatter interrogation
- Proved concept for disposable robot
- Hosted 1st International IED Workshop



Phase I - Tactical Optics Solutions

- Thermal Imagers
- Video Cameras
- Range Finders
- Stabilized Binoculars
- Wireless Camera Systems
- Spotting Scopes



Phase I - Other Solutions



Disposable Robot



Segway



Phase II - Rapid Development and Tng

- Material Solutions
 - Portable Forensics Kit
 - Non-Intrusive Detection
 - Vehicle Borne IED Defeat System
- Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to train the trainer



Phase II - Mobile Training Teams (MTT)

- Provided familiarization training related to DTRA sponsored equipment
- Provided to deploying EOD Forces with DTRA sponsored equipment
- Assisted in developing IED training scenarios
- Enabled development of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)
- Enabled the development and validation of new concepts of operations







Phase III – Prepare for the Future

 Investigate, introduce and implement long-term technology development to counter the IED threat

- Support the warfighter
- Prepare for the possibility of the WMD IED



Phase III – Other Technologies

Vessel Boarding & Inspection System







Broadband wireless connectivity, two way communications, streaming video and WMD sensor data from host ship through inspection of boarded vessel of interest

Deployable Technical Intelligence

Laboratory



Multi-Nodal Unattended Ground Sensor





Hand emplaced multi-modal (acoustic, seismic, PIR and chemical (CWA and TICS)) sensing wireless nodes for situational awareness and intrusion detection

Prototype Passive
Millimeter Wave
Imaging System
Suicide bomber
detection

State-of-the-art, immediately deployable, self-contained forensics laboratory for combat operations, contingency missions, and training



Phase III – Other Technologies

- Engineered Neutralization and Dispersion Source (ENDS) creates a synergistic blast/fragment load environment that is severe enough to dismember and neutralize the IED without precipitating high-order detonation
- Developed a system to detect and identify concealed radioactive emissions in extreme environments
- Developed an enzyme method for detecting the presence of blood, nerve, and blister agents
- Working on a low-cost system for rapid screening of suspect areas with near real-time identification of explosives





What Does This All Mean?

It means that with the continued emphasis on combating WMD and securing the homeland, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency will play an increasingly important role in the ability locate, access, diagnose and defeat improvised explosive devices.



Fielded Efforts

- DTRA has expended significant resources to put tools into the hand of the operator. The following slides depict some of these efforts
 - Detection Tools
 - Diagnostic Tools
 - Access Tools
 - Defeat tools



Detection Tool - XPAK

- Trace Explosives Detector
- Real time
- Built in GPS
- Detects Commercial Explosives
- Future Development
 - Smaller
 - Lighter
 - Detect HME





Device Information systems

- HME Data base everything you wanted to know about home made explosives
- CB Data base- all inclusive chemical and biological searchable data base
- Data Extraction Tool- Works with Triage system to help characterize device design and rapidly identify potential Improvised Nuclear Devices



Diagnostic Tool – Ltwt X-Ray Generator

- May replace XR150
- Improved lightweight X-ray sy
 - Lighter
 - More reliable
 - Higher energy
- Currently in development at LANL





Diagnostic Tool – Scanner

- Lightweight Phosphor panel digital scanner
- 7 pounds
- Battery powered
- Back packable





Diagnostic Tool – Digital Probe

- Improved performance
- Modular probe extensions
- Increased sensitivity across dynamic range
- Passive Diagnostic tool







Diagnostic Tool – Torion GCMS

Gas Chromatograph Mass Spectrometer


- Near Real Time <1AMU resolution
- System is totally self-contained
- Weighs less than 28 pounds
- Battery or fixed power operated
- Easy to operate with a simple three button navigation
- Ideal for rapid screening of chemicals including VOCs/SVOCs
- Explosives, chemical warfare agents, and hazardous substances





Diagnostic Tool – Metal Detector

- Smaller and lighter
- Folding and telescoping design
- Active/passive and merged modes
- 5lbs or less





Access Tool – Conex Cutter


- Lightweight
- High mechanical advantage
- Cuts a 2' X 2' square access panel in 1/8" conex skin in under 2 minutes





Access Tool – Smart Knife

- Battery powered
- Quick recharge
- Almost instant on
- Multiple blades for various type cuts
- Rapid temperature adjustment





Mechanical Tools – Coaxial Cutter

- Light weight
- Expandable in length
- Multiple heads for different applications
- Used on smaller coax





Mechanical Tools Medium Coaxial Cutter

- Light weight
- Expandable
- Multiple heads for various applications
- For medium size coax





Mechanical Tools– Heavy Coaxial Cutter

- Light weight
- Expandable
- Multiple heads for various applications
- For large heavy duty coax





Mechanical Tools – Coaxial Cutter Shaft


- Flexible shaft for use with a variety of co axial cutters
- Expandable to give greater flex





Mechanical Tools – Shorting Tool

- Insulated Shorting Tool Head
- Allows precise placement of shunting pins





Defeat Tool – Precision Aim Suite

- Single integrated system
- Constructs 3d view of target
- Allows exceptional accuracy with a variety of disruption charges






Defeat Tool – Shaped Charges

 Various types of shaped charges





Testing and Evaluation





Additional Support to EOD

- Technical Support Groups
- Equipment Testing



TSG Mission

- Provide training in radiological detection and monitoring to designated personnel.
- Conduct test and evaluation of Radiological detection equipment.





TSG Locations

- Washington Technical Support Group
 - Located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia
 - Provides training for forces in CONUS
 - Conducts Test and Evaluation of Equipment
 - Supports other TSGs and NTNF
- European Technical Support Group (ETSG)
 - Located in Stuttgart, Germany
 - Conducts training of EUCOM designated forces
- Pacific Technical Support Group (PTSG)
 - Located in Pearl City, Hawaii
 - Conducts training of PACOM designated forces
- CENTCOM Technical Support Group (CTSG)
 - Located in Manama, Bahrain
 - Conducts training of CENTCOM designated forces



Questions?

Making the World Safer...















...by combating weapons of mass destruction

Briefing to Global EOD Conference



European Defence Agency Building Collaborations in CIED

Jim Blackburn 29 April 2010

European Defence Agency

Building Capabilities for a Secure Europe





Programme EDA Background Ongoing EDA Projects **EDA CBRN EDA CIED** 152-720 -#4-C



EUROPEAN-US DEFENCE EXPENDITURE - GENERAL

Europe*

US**

GDP:

€11,3 Trillion

€ 10,5 Trillion

Total Defence Expenditure:

€491 Bn

Personnel Expenditure:

€110 Bn

€201 Bn

€100 Bn

Operations & Maintenance:

€43,3 Bn

€169,2 Bn

Equipment Procurement:

€29,1 Bn

€83,0 Bn

Research & Development:

€9,7 Bn

€58,0 Bn

(Includes: Research & Technology):

€2,6 Bn

€13,6 Bn




^{*}Europe means 26 EDA participating Member States

^{***}Euro/Dollar exchange rate is based on average for 2006: rate of 1,2556

Collaboration


European Collaborative Equipment Procurement as a Percentage of Total Equipment




EDA Participating Member States pMS



Participating Member States



The EDA in the European Institutions





Mission and functions

Development of defence capabilities in the field of crisis management

Promotion & enhancement of European armaments cooperation

"... to support the Council and the Member States in their effort to improve the EU's defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future."

Improve the EU's defence capabilities

Strengthening DTIB for the creation of an internationally competitive European Defence Equipment Market

Enhancement of effectiveness of European Defence Research and Technology (R & T)



EDA Structure **HR Baroness Ashton** Head of EDA **Chief Executive** Media / Comms **Planning / Policy Deputies Chief Executive Director R&T Director Armaments Director Capabilities Director Industry/Markets Director Corporate Services**



EDA Background

- Small Agency approximately 110 people
- Small budget only for enabling activities
- Only exists for member states to enhance their capabilities
- No inherent EU Capability is being built resides entirely in Member States
- Can only do what member states want to do
- Collaborative Forum
- Can inject proposals





EDA Industry & Markets

- European Defence Equipment Market EDEM
- European Defence Technological and Industrial base EDTIB
- Electronic Bulletin Board EBB
 - Code of Conduct (> 1 M€)
 - Code of Best Conduct in the Supply Chain

152-720 -#4-C



Armaments Cooperative Strategy

- More and Effective Cooperation
 - Promote Cooperative Programmes
 - Ensure the future of the EDTIB
 - Improve effectiveness and efficiency
- Strategic Approach
 - CST, CSR & CPP
- Setting the Preconditions
 - Harmonised Military Requirements
 - Member States Share Plans



Armaments Cooperative Projects

- On Going efforts
 - European Secure Software Radio
 - Mid Air Collision Avoidance System
 - Active Protection Systems for Armoured Vehicles
- Category B
 - Multinational Space based Imagery
 - Naval Mine Counter Measures
 - •BIO EDEP
 - Heavy Lift Helicopter
 - Helicopter Availability



Armaments Transversal Issues

- Military Airworthiness
- European Defence Test and Evaluation Base
- Matchmaking Database
- SDR Certification
- Armaments Strategy
- EDA / OCCAR Interface
- Standardization



■EDA R&T – 12 technological areas

Capability-Technology Area = CapTech

- 12 CapTechs in 3 major blocks reflecting Capabilities
 - IAP = Information Acquisition & Processing
 - ----> Knowledge
 - GEM = Guidance, Energy & Materials
 - ----> Engage
 - **ESM = Environment, Systems and Modeling**
 - ----> Manoeuvre



■EDA R&T – 12 technological areas

Information, Acquisition & Processing	Guidance, Energy & Materials	Environment, Systems & Modelling
IAP01 Components	GEM01 Materials & Structures	ESM01 Naval Systems & their Environment
IAP02 RF Sensor Systems & Signal Processing	GEM02 Energetics, Missiles & Munitions	ESM02 Aerial Systems & their Environment
IAP03 Optical Sensor Systems & Signal Processing	GEM03 Ground Systems & their Environment	ESM03 Systems of Systems, Space, Simulation & Experiment
IAP04 CIS & Networks	GEM04 Guidance & Control	ESM04 Human Factors & CBR Protection

R&T Directorate : 16 people




EDA Research & Technology

- Ad Hoc Cat A
 - JIP FP
 - 20 Contributing members (inc NO)
 - joint budget 55M€.
 - 3yrs initial programme.
 - -8 contracts let to date
 - JIP ICET
 - -11 cM (including NO)
 - -Joint budget 15.58M€
 - Call 1 resulted in the selection of 4 proposals that are contracted in Q4/2009.
 - -Call 2 ended 16 October 16 2009
- Ad Hoc Cat B projects
 - Contract signed 26
 - Awaiting contract 3
 - In preparation 22
- OB R&T Contracts 5 total value 1.4M€



Integrated Development Teams (IDT) Project Teams (PT)



Project Teams

Various Lines of Development:

- Concepts & Doctrine (e.g. NEC, ISTAR Architecture, CBRN Detection, Seaborne Logistics, etc.)
- <u>Training</u> (e.g. Intelligence Understanding of Mission Environment, Helo Pilots Advance Training, etc.)
- <u>Armament Cooperation</u> (e.g. Maritime Airborne Unmanned System, 21 Cent. Soldier System, etc.)
- Operational Cooperation (e.g. Radio Spectrum Management, Information Management, etc.)
- Industrial Cooperation (e.g. Third Parties Logistic Support, etc.)



CBRN

- PT CBRN DIM
- Ad Hoc Project Cat B BIO EDEP PREP

152-720 -# 4-C

- PT CBRN CM
- PT CBRN EOD





PT CBRN EOD

- Taken over from the Equipment Capability Programme (ECAP) in the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG)
- Made significant Progress in concepts, training and standardisation.
- Looking to move into wrap everything together into a Common Staff Target to present this to a package to the Member States.
- Will still take forward RDD, IND and MNT.

152-720 -





EDA CIED

Aim

- Develop capabilities in common
- Better use resources and ensure that a plan and staff structure exists for ESDP operations; in order
- Figure 1. Enhance capability of the pMS to Counter an IED Campaign.

Strategic Context

- One of the top 12 CDP actionable points.
- Many pMS involved in current operations involving IEDs.
- Capability Development needed quickly, but enduring.
- PT Members AT, BE, CZ, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, NL, PL, RO, SE, SK, UK

3rd Parties

- **EU Commission**
- **EU Council**
- **€** EuroPol
- **►**NATO



Guidelines for Developing a National CIED Capability

- **Search**
- Defeat the System

 Exploitation / Weapons Intelligence
- **Route Clearance**
- **EDD** (Including Manual Neutralisation **Techniques**)
- Mitigation







Current & Planned Work

- CSDP Concept
- EU Commission to conduct an overarching review of EU CIED multi-nationally and multi-agency. (Civ / Mil) – Proposals for examination.
 - Level 3 CIED Exploitation (EU)
 - Information / Intelligence Sharing
 - Interoperable Framework, Common Capability Requirements
 - Common Standards
 - External links
- Manual Neutralisation Techniques
 - Kick off meeting 27 Jan
 - 2010 Awareness Training
 - •2011 Exercise
- Lessons Learned 8 & 9 June 2010



Search Route & Clearance

- Search continue 5 year plan
 - 2009 Intermediate TTT Course Rome. Complete
 - 2010 Advanced Search Advisors Course: 5 30 Jul.
 - 2011 Basic Search TTT.
 - 2012 Specialist Search.
 - 2013 CBRN Search.
 - Fits with Italian National Plan
 - Courses run at Italian National CIED COE (Eng School)
 - Run by Ex-Brit Mil RESA s
 - EDA funded for pMS
- Route Clearance
 - Kick Off 10 June 2010 TALISMAN Briefing
 - pMS to express interest by end May
 - Possible IT lead



Exploitation

Level 3

- Discussed in Overarching EU CIED Review
- Currently 1 Bespoke Laboratory in the EU (UK)
- National Crime Laboratories.

Level 2

- EDA may spend 1m€ on Laboratory (demonstrator) this FY
- France as Lead Nation
- CSDP Pooled Asset
- Could be made available to ISAF

Level 1 - Nil



Potential CIED Exercise 2011

- Exercise format to be agreed
- Possible multiple vignettes
 - Strategic Civ / Mil over view seminars
 - Operational Exercise of CIED Staff Branch
 - Tactical level scenarios for CIED based on
 - -Search
 - -IEDD (Including MNT)
 - -Scene Management
 - -Exploitation
- To follow and build on IE CIED (IEDD)
- Possible venues being examined



EDA Role

- Providing a collaborative platform for pMS to develop capabilities
 - Coming together to fulfill "National Responsibilities"

EDA Can:

- Address conceptual issues, but not doctrine.
- Establishment of training courses and running of 1 off pilot training.
- Reach agreement on pan-European standards
- The in depth development of 1 off capabilities and capacities
- Provide a platform for pMS to find "Economies of scale" in training
- Work on Category B Programmes
- Be responsive to pMS requirements.

EDA Cannot:

- Provide on going enduring training
- Be seen to be work FOR NATO, but MUST work WITH NATO
- Work specifically for single or exclusive groups of Member States (within reason) © European Defence Agency 2010

www.eda.europa.eu







THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE


Defense, Diplomacy and Development

Colonel Leo Bradley

Chief, Explosive Ordnance Disposal & Humanitarian Mine Action OASD Partnership Strategy & Stability Operations



Office of the Secretary of Defense





Definitions

□ Explosive ordnance disposal: (JP 1-02, NATO) The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include explosive ordnance which has become hazardous by damage or deterioration. Also called **EOD**.



Definitions

- explosive ordnance (JP1-02, NATO): All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials, and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket, and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes, and depth charges; demolition charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature.
- unexploded explosive ordnance (JP1-02, NATO) Explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause. Also called UXO. See also explosive ordnance. (JP 3-15)




Definitions

- explosive ordnance disposal procedures (JP 1-02, NATO) Those particular courses or modes of action taken by explosive ordnance disposal personnel for access to, diagnosis, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of explosive ordnance or any hazardous material associated with an explosive ordnance disposal incident.
 - a. access procedures Those actions taken to locate exactly and gain access to unexploded explosive ordnance.
 - b. diagnostic procedures Those actions taken to identify and evaluate unexploded explosive ordnance.
 - c. render safe procedures The portion of the explosive ordnance disposal procedures involving the application of special explosive ordnance disposal methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components of unexploded explosive ordnance to prevent an unacceptable detonation.
 - d. recovery procedures Those actions taken to recover unexploded explosive ordnance.
 - e. final disposal procedures The final disposal of explosive ordnance which may include demolition or burning in place, removal to a disposal area, or other appropriate means.



EOD Capability Development





EOD Partnering

- EOD
- · C-IED
- HMA









The ERW Problem





Unsecured Explosive Ordnance is a Leading Cause of Global and Regional Instability




Mines and Development

- □ Landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) impede post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts in many mineaffected countries because they:
 - threaten community safety
 - hinder the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to their communities
 - damage infrastructure essential for economic development and increase rebuilding costs
 - limit access to health care, education and other basic social services
 - prevent the use of assets vital to sustainable livelihoods. For example, water sources, irrigation channels and land used for agriculture, grazing, housing/resettlement and commerce
 - deter public and private investment and economic development through increased uncertainty, cost and delays resulting from suspect presence of landmines



Stability Ops: Disarm, De-mobilize, Reintegrate



Depot: Collect, inventory, Inspect, store, re-issue, dispose


Ammunition Depot: Collect, inventory, Inspect, re-issue, demil, dispose, store

Personnel: Identify, integrate into Armed Forces, re-train, demobilize, re-integrate

EOD and demining



Propellant Stabilizer Degradation





Dangerous Depots

2008


- 10 July Kagan, Uzbekistan: 3 KIA, 21 WIA
- 3 July Sophia, Bulgaria: 6KM evacuation
- 15 March Albania: 24 KIA, 300+ WIA destroyed 400 homes

2007

- 29 December Medellin, Columbia: 2 KIA, 7 WIA
- 26 July Aleppo Syria: 15 KIA, 50 WIA
- 17 June Mbandaka, Democratic Republic of Congo: 3 KIA, 52 WIA
- 7 April Khartoum, Sudan: no reported casualties. Airport closed temporarily
- 22 March Maputo, Mozambique: 100+ KIA, 500+ WIA



U.S. Tactical Explosive Mishaps





DOD Humanitarian Mine Action

□ The DoD Humanitarian Mine Action Training Program

- Authorized by 10 USC 407
- Planned and executed by GCC as part of TSC plan
- DSCA approves and funds through Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriations
- OSD SO/LIC&IC provides policy oversight and coordinates with DOS weapons removal and abatement program

☐ Humanitarian Demining Research and Development (HD R&D) Program

- Executed by Army's Night Vision and Electronic Sensor Lab
- Develops, demonstrates and validates demining technology
- Provides equipment prototypes to NGOs and partner nations
- Technology is evaluated against actual threats in real world environment



DoD HMA Process

Preconditions for U.S. Assistance

- Host Nation must submit a formal request for assistance through the U.S. Embassy
 - Hostilities have ceased
 - Workable peace agreement is in place
- □ USG Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) Sub-group on Humanitarian Mine Action
 - Chair DoS, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
 - Co-Chair DoD, Office of Stability Operations Capabilities
- □ Policy Assessment Visit (PAV)
 - Representatives from DoS / OSD / COCOM conduct PAV. Based on results of this visit, USG decides whether to initiate/restart a HMA program with that country.
 - If approved, COCOM conducts a....
- Requirements Determination Site Survey (RDSS)
 - ...which identifies specific goals, objectives and resource requirements

- □ Country Team and COCOM coordinate possible initiatives
- □ COCOM Prioritizes proposals and submits to OSD
- □ OSD staffs proposals with DoD/State/interagency and approves appropriate projects
- □ COCOM tasks units to execute projects
- ☐ Country team and COCOM evaluate effectiveness



Humanitarian Demining Prohibitions

No member of the US armed forces will:

"engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines or other explosive remnants of war (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a US military operation); or

provides such assistance as part of a military operation that does not involve the armed forces.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 407





HUMANITARIAN DEMINING TRAINING CENTER U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

www.wood.army.mil/hdtc/

Angel Belen – Acting Director

Angel.belen@us.army.mil

573-563-6199



HDTC Role in HMA

- ☐ Train U.S. Military Forces to provide Train-the-Trainer Humanitarian Mine Action instruction in Mine Affected countries.
- □ Collect and disseminate information on Mine Action for U.S. Government agencies to facilitate execution of the U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program.
- □ Provide SME in support of U.S. Government Policy and Agendas
- □ Train to the International Mine Action Standards



Demining Training Course

- Mine Identification
- Mine detection by visual means
- Mine detection operations and equipment
- Mine detection by probing
- Unexploded Ordnance Identification and Disposal
- Procedures for marking lanes and minefields

- Demolitions
- Booby Traps
- □ Demining Tools
- □ Demining Site Set-up
- □ Clearing Process
- Demining/Disposal
- Minefield Handoff



Tactical Countermining VS. Humanitarian Demining

□ Tactical countermining

- Focuses on enhancing force <u>mobility</u>
- Minefields must be rapidly detected in all possible conditions
- <u>Breaching</u> provides for rapid clearance without the need to find every mine

☐ Humanitarian demining

- Detection of <u>each</u> landmine more important than the speed of movement
- Goal of demining is to locate and destroy <u>all landmines/ERW</u> within a large designated area
- Economic considerations are important in deciding if and when a specific minefield will be cleared
- Safety is the most important consideration
- Casualties are unacceptable




Burundi ERW Training













Kagan ASP Response

- □ 21 Jul 08- ARCENT notified by Defense Attaché .
- Uzbeks requested three types of equipment: land mine detectors, water metal detectors, and bomb suits.
- □ DATT's guidance was —let'sget there first with the most stuff."
- □ 03 Aug 08- Pre-Deployment Site Survey Team (2 pax) on site.
- □ 21 Aug 08- the Training Team (5 pax) with equipment arrived in Uzbekistan.
- □ 28 Aug 08 all Uzbek / USEMB objectives were met









DoD Humanitarian Demining Research & Development Program



www.humanitariandemining.org

Sean Burke – Program Manager sean.burke@nvl.army.mil 703-704-1047



HD R&D Organization



Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

Program Funding, Guidance

- Provides Program Guidance and Oversight
- Approve requests for in-country assessments
- Approve requests for operational field evaluations
- Liaison with other Government agencies (DoS)



Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate Countermine Division

Program Execution

- Determine Requirements
- Structure Program
- Develop/Demonstrate Prototype Equipment
 - Contracts with Industry
 - In-House Developments Using NVESD Personnel and Shop Facilities
- Perform In-Country Assessments
- Conduct In-Country Operational Field Evaluations
- Assist with Transition Prototype Equipment into Operational Use
- Inform demining community

A cooperative effort



HD R&D Program Objectives

Develop, Demonstrate, and Validate Technologies to be Used in International Humanitarian Demining by:

- □ Assessing Existing Technologies
 - Assess commercial off-the-shelf equipment
 - Integration of mature technologies (e.g. sifting implements)
 - Thorough evaluation of new technologies
- □ Developing New Technologies
 - Integrate, adapt, and modify commercial off-theshelf equipment to particular demining missions
 - New development of equipment if no suitable commercial version exists
- □ Transitioning Technologies Into the Field





HUMANITARIAN DEMINING R&D PROGRAM

FYO9 Operational Field Evaluations (OFEs)



Iraq

Sifting Technology

Afghanistan

HSTAMIDS
MANTIS
Orbit Sifter
Sifting Buckets




Thailand

Air Spade Beaver Peco Cutter SDTT Tempest Uni-Disk

PR - ViequesNemesis M3



Improved Backhoe



Long Tools Tempest

Angola 🔭

Air-Spade
Detonation Trailer
HSTAMIDS
JCB Loadall
Mine Stalker
RMC

Cambodia

Badger
Explosive Harvesting
HSTAMIDS (3 orgs)
Long Tools
MAXX+
Sifting Buckets
Storm
Tempest

Vietnam

Large Loop
MDA
Peco Cutter
Shinn/Birdseye Cutters
Walking Tractor

39 Systems in 10 Countries

Chile

Air Spade Multi-Tool Excavator



AN/PSS-14

3.5"

Multi-Pattern Coverage

7"-7.5" coil

The HD program is upgrading the AN/PSS-14 dual sensor hand-held mine detector employed by U.S. Forces in OEF/OIF in order to provide better detection capability and enhanced training and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).







Explosive Harvesting Program

- De-mils excess ordnance into demo charges
- Meets almost all of the NGOs requirement for donor charges
- □ Produces scrap metal available for sale







Explosive Harvesting Program















Questions?



COL Leo Bradley
Leo.Bradley@osd.mil
703-697-5607



NDIA GLOBAL EOD Conference & Exhibition "Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives"

NATO EOD Working Group Update

Joint EOD and Search
Wg Cdr James Brudenell - Royal Air Force





SCOPE

- Introduction to the NSO and NSA
- Military Committee Land Standardisation Board (MCLSB) Working Group (WG) Structures
- Development of NATOs C-IED Philosophy
- EOD WG priorities support to the current


C-IED Fight







NATO Standardization Organization





NSA Standardisation & Interoperability

- Why Standardisation?
 To enhance the Alliance's operational effectiveness
- Why Interoperability?
 To allow forces and force partners to train, exercise and operate effectively together gaining the best results from resources used









NATO Standardisation Organisation (NSO)

Main Objectives

- Alliance authority on standardisation and the focus for alliance standardisation efforts
- Develop and maintain NATO standardisation policy
- Identify and address priority areas for standardisation
- Contribute to standardisation requirements in NATO Force Planning
- Monitor the implementation of NATO Standards









Aims of Standardisation

To Improve Cooperation
To Eliminate Duplication

& so achieve

Interoperability





Aims of Standardisation

To Improve Cooperation
To Eliminate Duplication

& so achieve

Interoperability

Greater Flexibility


Greater Operational Effectiveness

Shared Costs






NATO Standardisation Agency (NSA)







MCLSB EOD WG Structure







Countries Represented by NATO EOD WG Delegations

19 countries represented total NATO membership of 28 independent countries

9 member countries not represented in the NATO EOD WG



Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, ,Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Poland Romania, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey




Albania, Croatia
Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland,
Czech Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Slovenia





STANAG/AP Development






EOD WORKING GROUP **AAP-03 / AAP-47**




NATO C-IED Philosophy







NATO C-IED Philosophy







EOD WG Priorities

- Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Information Centre - EODTIC
 - Digitisation
 - Transformation
 - Extended Membership







STANAG 2293 Military Search

- STANAG 2293 Military Search
 Techniques and Procedures –
 ATP-73 Vol 2
- Completed draft process
 agreed to move to ratification
 draft 1 at the NATO EOD WG
 12 16 Apr 2010
- Provides a sound publication for interoperability and capability development for nations looking to grow their own Search capability









Military Search - Objectives

Offensive

- Gain Intelligence
- Deny Resources & Opportunity
- Secure material of possible Evidential Value

Defensive

- Force Protection
- Protection of Pre-planned Events
- Protection of Critical Infrastructure









STUDY 2607 Electronic Warfare (EW) Support to Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

- Urgent requirement to improve Alliance understanding of ECM both FP and EOD on multinational Deployed Operations
- Study Draft V2 agreed at last EOD WG meeting 12 -16 Apr 2010
- Linked to UK development of a NATO EOD ECM Advisors Course









STANAG 2370 Principles of Improvised Device Disposal – AEODP-3

- Ratification Drafts of Vol 1
 (EOD Staff Officers Guide)
 and Vol 2 (EOD Operators
 Guide) submitted to nations
 for response by 4 Jun 10
- Following ratification, work will begin on SD Ed 3 of STANAG 2370 to harmonise documents across WGs relating to C-IED activity









EOD Lessons Learnt Process

- Led by Spain on the TTP Panel
- The EOD LL Team have researched access protocol to NATO LL databases
- Identified some 36 LL's that are EOD relevant
- Address national access issues
- Distribute to National POCs for review
- Group discussion
- Implementation








EOD Information Management System and Analysis Tools

- Study underway to identify the requirement
- Review the requirement against current systems both NATO and national level
- Identify a way forward measured against existing individual national security constraints







NATO Identification and Disposal of Surface OTAN and Air Munitions

STANAG 2369 - AEODP-6 (B)
 was promulgated in Dec 09

 Clears the way for the distribution by the US of the NATO EOD Publication Sets

(NEPS)







Summary

- Standardisation & Interoperability are the enablers to NATOs delivery of effect.
- The EOD WG's Relationship & Interaction with the C-IED WG needs to be developed.
- EOD WG priorities are focused on the delivery of theatre effect:
 - Development of joint operations IEDD capability
 - Broadening of EOD EW capability.
 - Search.
 - Effective use of information.











Interagency Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

Dr. Edwin A. Bundy
Program Manager
TSWG Improvised Device Defeat Subgroup and
EOD/LIC Program



Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office



EOD/LIC Mission

The Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Low-Intensity Conflict (EOD/LIC) program provides Joint Service EOD technicians and Special Operations Forces (SOF) operators with the advanced technologies and mission-focused solutions required to address current and emerging threats presented by unconventional and asymmetric warfare.





Remote Operations and Advanced Mobility

- Develop capabilities to remotely approach, enter, and conduct reconnaissance operations in hazard areas and danger zones.
- Enhance mobility-related technologies and equipment to facilitate safely approaching, operating in, and withdrawing from hazardous environments.
- Develop systems and technologies to gather and store operational information for transmission to operational personnel and unit commanders.
- Improve technologies for the relocation of unexploded ordnance, hazardous materials, and improvised devices.






Remote Operations and Advanced Mobility


















Access and Disablement

- Develop tools to quickly and efficiently breach or gain access to structures, barriers, vehicles, and containers
- Develop chemical, mechanical, electrical, and explosively actuated systems for the neutralization and disruption of unexploded ordnance and improvised devices
- Improve technologies for rendering fuzing and firing systems inoperable





Access and Disablement























Detection, Diagnostics, and Analysis

- Develop tools to locate and verify the presence of improvised devices, unexploded ordnance, booby traps, and other threats
- Develop technologies to determine the specific type, condition, and characteristics of unexploded ordnance and improvised device components, and the specific hazards associated with each
- Improve methods to analyze and evaluate improvised device construction





Detection, Diagnostics, and Analysis









Protective Measures and Effects Mitigation

Advance the development of personnel protection systems for operations in enhanced hazard environments. Develop novel and improved solutions to protect personnel and property from blast, fragmentation, and ballistic hazards.







Sustainability and Operations Management

- Develop tools and equipment to enhance situational awareness and operational capability during incident response or direct action operations
- Develop human performance improvement tools that foster the advancement of knowledge related to unexploded ordnance, improvised devices, and hazardous environments
- Develop tools and training for conducting novel and advanced missions related to improvised devices and hazardous environments.





Sustainability and Operations Management









IDD Mission


Identify, prioritize, and execute research and development projects that satisfy mission critical needs, fill capability gaps, and address interagency requirements for advanced technologies to safely and effectively defeat improvised terrorist devices. Emphasis is placed on technologies to enhance the training and support of operational personnel in the location, identification, render safe, and disposal of homemade explosives, improvised explosive devices, and other emerging terrorist threats.





Research Challenges

- In December 2008, the D-IED SC published, Research Challenges in Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States
- The report outlines ten challenge areas where concentrated research can be most beneficial in combating IED use in the homeland







Research Challenges

- C-IED Network Attack and Analysis
- Detection of Homemade Explosives
- Standoff Rapid Detection of Person Borne IEDs
- Vehicle-borne IED Detection
- IED Access and Defeat
- Radio Controlled IED Countermeasures
- IED Assessment and Diagnostics
- Waterborne IED Detect and Defeat Systems
- IED Threat Characterization and Signatures
- IED Warnings





Device Defeat

- Develop advanced technologies to defeat the broad spectrum of improvised terrorist devices to include improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs), person borne IEDs, and enhanced hazard devices containing chemical, biological, or radiological materials
- Develop innovative, cost-effective disruption and precision render safe solutions that increase standoff distance, reduce collateral damage, and decrease risk to the improvised devices defeat operator
- Improve neutralization techniques for both sensitive and insensitive explosives and enhanced payloads such as flammable liquids and gases.





Device Defeat















Identification and Diagnostics


- Advance the capability of bomb technicians to interrogate unknown or suspect items and packages
- Develop technologies to locate and identify improvised devices and enhanced fillers, and diagnose key fuzing and firing components
- Develop tools to assist bomb technicians in the identification of U.S. and non-U.S. ordnance and firing systems incorporated into or modified for use in improvised devices






Identification and Diagnostics















Emerging Threats


- Advance production of effective countermeasures to neutralize or defeat radio-controlled IEDs and provide safe environments for bomb technicians
- Develop, characterize, and test technology solutions to safely and effectively render safe or neutralize devices containing improvised homemade explosives
- Develop, characterize, and test technology solutions to effectively render safe improvised devices using novel fuzing systems that incorporate such items as an electronic sensor, microcontroller, or mechatronic components






Emerging Threats





LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE













Remote Procedures

- Develop advanced application systems to remotely access, diagnose, and defeat improvised devices
- Advance development of manufacturer and model-independent products and robotic tools with "plug and play" interface
- Develop open-architecture, navigation, communication, and operator controls for robotic platforms, tools, and sensors.





Remote Procedures
















Tool Characterization and Information Resources


- Improve performance evaluation methodologies, test procedures, and tool characterization models for improvised device defeat technologies
- Conduct ongoing evaluation and improvement of tools, methods, and protocols for confirming the accuracy of detection equipment, reliability of diagnostic tools, and completeness of neutralization and safeing techniques
- Advance training concepts and information delivery systems that promote the tactical and operational response readiness required to effectively, safely, and efficiently counter improvised devices and emerging terrorist threats





Tool Characterization and Information Resources










Maritime Security and Water-Borne IEDs

• Develop technologies to protect ships, boats, docking facilities, offshore platforms, shore-side loading facilities, power plants, bridges, and marine cables and pipelines from any form of terrorist attack





Maritime Security and Water-Borne IEDs



DIDSON Sonar



Modular Unmanned Surface Craft-Littoral (MUSCL)





Summary

- User-focused approach to IED Defeat
- Seeking participation from other government agencies
- Solutions for both military and civilian bomb technicians
- Leveraging interagency and international contributions

Contact information:

eodlic@eodlic.cttso.gov iddsubgroup@tswg.gov



NDIA Conference on Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives



Counter-IED Challenge:

Securing Special Events, Transportation Security and Beyond



U.S. Domestic Explosives Threats

- Bomb threats and suspicious packages in the U.S.
 - Over 2,300 since 2004*
 - Almost daily
- Terrorists continue planning explosives attacks in the U.S.







3

"Use of a conventional explosive continues to be the most probable al-Qa'ida (domestic) attack scenario" said Director of National Intelligence to Congress Intelligence Committee, January 2007

International Domestic Explosives Events

- Bomb threats continue worldwide
 - 82,000 terrorist incidents between 1970 and 2007 *
 - Top three terrorist targets:
 - Private Citizen's property 20%

• Government 17%

• Business 16%

- 51% of time terrorists' tactic was bombing
- Over 600 IED attacks <u>per month</u> worldwide
 - Aug 2008 to Aug 2009 averaged
 - Data excluded Iraq & Afghanistan

 $[^]st$ —@bal Terrorism Trends", START presentation at the National Press Club on 14 September 2009.

A Continuing Challenge

—Juts as today's threats to our national security and strategic interests are evolving and interdependent, so too must our efforts to ensure the security of our homeland reflect these same characteristics. As we develop new capabilities and technologies, our adversaries will seek to evade them, as was shown by the attempted terrorist attack on Flight 253 on December 25, 2009. We must constantly work to stay ahead of our adversaries."

Secretary Janet Napolitano

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review February 2010



Military and Domestic

- Some transferable technologies

- Different environments, threats, procedures



- Constant threat
- Population restricted in movement
- · Access to certain areas limited

Protecting Warfighters in Theater





- Countermeasures constrained by civil liberties and operations within an open and free society
- Homemade explosives proliferating world wide

Protecting Citizens in a Free and Open Society

Domestic IED Threat Domains

Person-Borne IED

Suicide bomber or leave behind bomb

Vehicle-Borne IED

Parked vehicle or suicide attack



Rail



Public arena events



Border crossing or vehicle raveling to high-value target



Terminals


Seaport, ships and ferries




Buildings, malls and **National Monuments**




Utilities



Domestic Terrorist IED Attack Cycle



DHS C-IED Investment Emphasis



S&T Countering Domestic Explosive Threats Program

Terrorist IED Attack Timeline OBTAIN CONDUCT IMMEDIATE LONG-TERM INITIAL ATTACK INTENT **OPERATIONAL EFFECTS OPERATIONS EFFECTS PLANNING** RESOURCES Prevent/Deter **Predict** Detect Defeat *Mitigate* **Actionable Indicators Predictive Screening Person Borne IED Bomb Access & Blast Mitigation** & Countermeasures **Diagnostics** Blast resistant **Behavior Analysis** Suicide Bomber materials Community **Video Tracking** Type of Explosive

Group Characteristics Pre-incident Behaviors

& Rhetoric

Integrated Framework

Countermeasure

Characteristics

Evaluation

Video Identification &

Alert

Risk Prediction

Target Prediction

Staging Area Prediction

Leave-behind

Vehicle Borne IED

Integration &

Demonstration

Canine

Device Triggers

Render Safe

Electronic

Countermeasures

Inerting

Robotics

Protective

countermeasures

Stabilize damaged

structures

Urban blast effects

Predictive models

Effective Risk Communications

Cross Cutting:

Standards, Technology Demonstration/ System Integration Outreach, Integration of Public Perception Data, Community Resilience Information Sharing: Intelligence Data Sharing (Intel Community); Interagency Technology, Resource & Test sharing (DoJ, DoD, DoE)

Counter-IED Investment Areas


- Social and behavioral science to identify potential IED threats
 - Real-time, automated video-based identification of suspicious behaviors
 - Framework integrating social and behavioral science indicators of radicalization
- Strategies to prevent potential IED attacks before they occur
 - Tested, effective strategies to counter violent extremism in domestic context



Program Goals: Improved ability to assess and counter potential extremist violence

Needs/Gaps:

- Identify indicators that actors are moving toward extremist violence
- Analyze the impact of countermeasures used to prevent extremist violence and IED attacks




Strategy/Approach:

Utilize multiple social and behavioral science methods to extract indicators Develop and validate an integrated framework Systematically assess the efficacy of countermeasures using qualitative and quantitative methods



Security







Early Activities

- Delivered reports on
 - Characteristics of IED incidents based on analysis of Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
 - Existing polls of U.S. Muslims (preliminary)
 - Five international —d-radicalization" programs and the measures used to evaluate their efficacy
- Sponsored interagency workshops on
 - Coding methodologies for case studies
 - Community-level indicators of radicalization
 - The role of the internet in radicalization
 - Survey methodologies for assessing attitudes toward terrorism and counterterrorism initiatives







International Programs' Research on Violent Extremism

Radicalization in Europe and North America:
Parallels and Divergence

Social Determinants of Terrorist Organizations' Resilience in Latin America







The Impact of Israeli Counterterrorism Interventions on Rate and Intensity of Terrorist Activity



Threat Assessment of Terrorist and Extremist Organizations in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand



Counter-IED Investment Areas

- Improved detection capabilities for known and emerging IED threats
 - Imaging technologies
 - Spectroscopic and trace detection technologies
- Improved probability of detection by screening for IEDs more efficiently while minimizing effect on flow of people and commerce
 - Non-contact interrogation
 - Enhanced algorithms for automation
- Improved first responders' ability to react to and defeat discovered IED threats
 - IED identification and defeat tools
 - Radio frequency jamming equipment



Diversified investment portfolio to maximize potential for success

C-IED Detect

Program Goal: Develop enabling technologies and operational solutions to improve customer IED threat detection capabilities


Customers/Partners:


- USSS, OIP, TSA, FPS, CBP, and USCG
- JIEDDO, USMC, ONR, DTRA, NIST, DNDO, NRL, NSWC-DD, and TSWG

Needs/Gaps:

- Detect explosive devices worn or carried by individuals (person borne threats)
- Detect explosive devices in unattended packages (leave behind threats)
- Detect explosive devices at a checkpoint concealed within stationary or slow moving vehicles (vehicle borne threats)







C-IED Detect

Strategy/Approach:

- Perform signature characterization studies of realistic explosive threat devices: provides data for detection requirements, test standards and performance benchmarks for detector development
- Develop cueing, tracking and target selection systems: incorporates advanced hardware and software solutions into layered security architectures
- Perform system analysis, engineering and architecture design: provides analysis of alternatives, baseline systems design, and integration of component technologies
- Develop high resolution detection technology: provides advanced imaging and trace detection hardware and software with improved detection performance characteristics to address broadening threat detection requirements
- Perform laboratory and operational test and evaluation of existing and emerging security solutions: baselines existing system performance, measures advanced system capabilities and defines technology shortfalls



C-IED Detect

Accomplishments:

- Demonstrated the use of a broadband, tunable laser system to enhance standoff threat detection capability
- Established a standoff detection test bed with interagency partners to demonstrate an integrated system approach towards explosives detection
- Initiated programs
 - to detect vehicle borne explosive devices through the use of high energy techniques
 - to detect individuals carrying or wearing explosive devices, based upon acoustic and infrared detection techniques
 - for standoff and non-contact detection of trace amounts of explosives



C-IED Response/Defeat

Program Goals: Initiate, prioritize, and execute research and development projects that meet bomb squad requirements to effectively render explosive devices safe, placing specific emphasis on technologies to access, diagnose, and defeat terrorist improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

Customers/Partners:

- OBP, OIP, FBI, ATF, USSS, USCG, CBP, State/Local Bomb Squads
- JIEDDO, TSWG, NIJ, FBI

Needs/Gaps:

- Analyze vehicles and leave behind packages utilizing Access and Diagnostic tools to determine content
- Defeat the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) containing both sensitive and insensitive explosives and enhanced payloads (includes VBIED, PBIED, WMD devices).
- Increase standoff distances, reduce collateral damage, and enhance the safety of bomb squad technicians.



C-IED Response/Defeat

Strategy/Approach:

- Develop and adapt a suite of interoperable response tools to improve and standardize bomb squad capabilities (e.g. platforms, interfaces, common architecture, standards, ECM, RFbased bomb squad technologies)
- Leverage existing robotics technology to provide advancements in stand-off and remote diagnosis and defeat
- Evolve advancements in robotic arm manipulation, while increasing power supply, decreasing overall weight, extending operational time, and improving navigation, communication, safety and operational control
- Enable detect sensors to integrate with bomb squad robotic platforms
- Conduct Test and Evaluate at the Bomb Squad test Bed (transition via the FBI's Hazardous Device School)



C-IED Response/Defeat

Accomplishments:

- Established an interagency technical requirements working group to gather future Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) technical requirements
- Established the Bomb Squad Test Bed with the Michigan State Police to perform test and evaluation on prototype equipment
- Verified the following technology at the Michigan test bed:
 - Single-Sided Imaging System to image suspect VBIEDs
 - Pneumatic Water Canon to render a suspect VBIED safe
- Drafted and delivered the Bomb Squad Strategic Plan, as well a explosive tool test data, to state and local bomb squads

Future Direction:

- Develop future Render Safe Tools through derivation and validation of vehicle bomb characteristics
- Continue to advance the capabilities of the current fleet of robots (e.g. employ surgical precision tools)
- Develop an intuitive diagnostics capability that can be quickly deployed when vehicle bombs are suspected
- Develop DHS-centric performance requirements for the next generation ECM systems
- Improve the Test and Evaluation and Transition processes by leveraging the Bomb Squad Test Bed and the FBI Hazardous Devices School



Counter-IED Investment Areas

- Enhanced blast resistance
 - Advanced blast-resistant materials
 - Models for assessing damage from blast
- Mitigation of effects
 - Rapidly deployable means to stabilize damaged structures
- Community resilience
 - Communication of clear, understandable, credible warnings in the event of an IED threat
 - Recovery in the aftermath of an attack



Preventive measures to reduce effects of an event, help for recovery afterwards

Advanced Materials Research

- Conduct basic research and testing of materials such as ultra-high performance concretes, ceramics, foams, layered composites, woven and nano-enabled materials
- Report on the current state of the art for use of advanced materials to counter IED effects
- Research UHPC/RPC to advance
 - Ultra high strength
 - Ductility, flexibility
 - Toughness, Impact resistance
 - Durability
 - Impermeability
 - Freeze/thaw, corrosion resistance
 - Abrasion resistance





Novel materials may have more desirable environmental, durability, weight, aging, and cost properties.

Stabilization of Buildings

 Criteria for interpretation and dissemination of data, triage, and decision-making methods

(Near-Collapse Buildings Workshop, TEEX April 28-29th, 2010)

 First Responders Search and Rescue Issues

(Monitoring and Sensing Workshop, Oxford, MS April 6-7th, 2010)

Identify sensor technology to allow effective monitoring

- Identify user-friendly technology that will not hinder the mission of first responders
- Facility reconciliation of field data with analytical models






Bridge Vulnerability

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

- Study the vulnerability of steel plates, girders, and cables to terrorist threats, particularly explosives, and updating computational models based on the results.
- Specimens to evaluate vintage bridges will be taken from
 - Golden Gate Bridge (CA)
 - · Crowne Point Bridge (NY) and
 - Williamsburg Bridge (NYC)

as they are being refurbished or demolished in order to evaluate IED effects on vintage bridges.



Impact

- Provides vulnerability information for bridge components subjected to aging, wear, and weathering
- Data can be used to validate and improve numerical models that predict failure for bridges subjected to explosives
- Understanding failure mechanisms for bridge components enables more effective design of protective countermeasures




Capitalizing on existing assets provides data on effects of real-world aging on material properties

Improved Numerical Modeling of Soils

The Problem

- Existing numerical &constitutive models for blast effects in soils do not match the test results
- Current estimates are
 - based limited data sets
 - have insufficient information about soil damage
 - unable to evaluate the integrity and condition of remaining material



Typical result for blast experiment on an embankment dam

Our Approach

- Conduct physical tests and numerical simulations to determine the shortfalls of current models and how they can be improved
- Improve on current physics based, 1st principle approaches to modeling soils subjected to blast and seismic loads

Impact

 Accurate models will reduce the need to conduct extensive and expensive physical tests to address new threat scenarios.



Community Perceptions of Technology Panels

- A formal process
 - to understand and incorporate community perceptions of critical technologies within the US.
 - to maintain the balance between security and personal privacy/civil rights and liberties
- Provides DHS agencies and Program Managers with insight <u>prior to</u> development and deployment of technology.
 - potential reactions
 - issues
 - obstacles to a technology
- Engages the public, making them active stakeholders in the research and development of critical technologies.



Community Perspectives into Technology Development: Challenges and Issues

- Civil Rights, Civil Liberties
- Privacy, Intrusiveness and Invasiveness
- Privacy of information
- Convenience and Comfort
- Perception of Threat
- Location
- Cost
- Complexity, usability
- Safety
- Tradeoff value




Incorporating Community Perspectives into Technology Development





CPT Panels 2008

- Microwave Vehicle Stopping
- Raman Spectroscopy- IED Standoff Explosive Detection
- Mobile Biometrics
- Nonlinear Acoustic IED Standoff Threat Detection




CPT Panels 2009

- Northern Border Technology RFID Registration and Low Resolution Imaging (Joint panel with Canada)
- Standoff Threat Detection- Imaging Systems



Homeland Security S&T Enterprise



Summary

- The domestic threat is real; preparation is vital
- To protect our people in a free and open society, we must get ahead of the terrorists
 - Counter violent extremism/radicalization
 - Prepare people and infrastructure
- Cooperation makes us stronger
 - Domestic
 - International



Contact Information

- PEO, C-IED: SandT.cied@dhs.gov
- Broad Agency Announcements Solicitation Topics
 - Long Range BAA addresses needs of 6 S&T divisions
 - For more about BAAs, visit <u>www.FedBizOpps.gov</u>
 and https://baa.st.dhs.gov
- NSTC Domestic IED Subcommittee report, Research
 Challenges in Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the
 United States:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/nstc-domestic-ied-2008.pdf





Homeland Security



What is "terrorism"?

- Title 18 USC Section 2331, (5)
 - (5) the term —donestic terrorism" means activities that—
 - (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
 - (B) appear to be <u>intended</u>—
 - (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
 - (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
 - (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
 - (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.





ORDNANCE CORP WORLD-WIDE VTC



EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL DIRECTORATE BRIEF



SGM Frey



EOD DIRECTORATE MISSION



 Develop, integrate, and synchronize Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, & Facilities (DOTMLPF-RIO) requirements for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) throughout TRADOC and coordinate Joint, Interagency, Intergovernment, and Multinational (JIIM) EOD requirements in coordination with SCOE and DA G3/5/7.



EOD DIRECTORATE MISSION



28 Required20 Available (7 mil, 3 GS,10 Contractors)

Concept plan end state is 28 Auth

EOD Director's Office

"Provide a single focal point for all EOD issues within TRADOC – a critical need according to the DA G3/5/7" Concept paper, p.3


Training Division

Doctrine and Capabilities Development Division



EOD DIRECTORATE MISSION





- •Bldg 10200 occupied by Mar 2010
- •Concept paper at CASCOM TRADOC (informal adjudication of G-8, ARCIC comments)



EOD DIRECTORATE DOTMLPF REVIEW



	CURRENT	FUTURE
DOCTRINE	 FMI 4-30.50 (Army EOD Ops) FM 4-30.51 / MCRP 3-17.2A (UXO Procedures) FM 4-30.16 (MTTP for EOD in Joint OE) 	 FMI 4-30.50 rewrite and conversion to ATTP 4-32 Merger of Army and Marine Corps only manual in MTTP Rewrite of MTTP for update of Joint TTPs Participate in FM 4-3 (Ordnance Ops) pub ATTP 5-0.1 (EOD Appendix)
CONCEPTS	• Core participation in Site Exploitation (SE), Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) and Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT) development projects	 2010 Army Operating Concept 2010 Army Functional Concept for Sustain 2010 Army Functional Concept for Protect
ORGANIZATION	Transformation of Legacy EOD structure to Modular (FDU 05-02) Begin BRAC restationing to projection platforms	 Complete Modular transformation (through FY 15) Complete BRAC restationing
TRAINING	 89E Course 89D ALC, SLC Advanced IED Defeat (AIED-D) Gator Transformation (JATAC) Tactical Post Blast Course EOCA DL Modules 	 89E Course 89D ALC, SLC Advanced IED Defeat (AIED-D) Gator Transformation (JATAC) Tactical Post Blast Course EOCA DL Modules



EOD DIRECTORATE DOTMLPF REVIEW



	CURRENT	FUTURE
MATERIAL	 Future Radiographic System (FRS) Decision Support System (DSS) Advanced EOD Robotic System (AEODRS) MMPV-Panther AN/PDX-2 Radiac Sets MK 1 MOD 0 and MK 2 MOD 0 (CIP) AN/PLT-4 CREW AN/PLT-5 Man Portable CREW 	 Blast Overpressure Tool (Maxi Candle) High Fidelity WMD Identification Electronic Safe and Armed (ESAF) Next Generation Advanced Bomb Suit Light Weight Multifunctional Disrupter
LDR DEVELOPMENT	 89E Course 89D ALC, SLC Advanced IED Defeat (AIED-D) Gator Transformation (JATAC) Tactical Post Blast Course EOCA DL Modules 	 89E Course 89D ALC, SLC Advanced IED Defeat (AIED-D) Gator Transformation (JATAC) Tactical Post Blast Course EOCA DL Modules
PERSONNEL	 AIP CSRB, SRB Career Pay Attrition at School House Enduring Recruiting Program EOD Plans/Positions with BCT/DIV/CORP Prerequisites OD Website EOD inject 	 Maintain Throughput at school house Maintain Plans positions within DIV and CORPs staffs Maintains plans and ops liaison personnel within BCT
FACILITIES	 Restationing Packet for EOD Directorate Student Load exceeding capacity of NAVSCHOLED 	 Continuously monitor restationing Package MILCON projects to increase Lodging and classroom facilities



A Bad Suit-The Strategic Challenge of Irregular Warfare

Innovation for Peace





Outline

- Introduction
- What is Irregular Warfare?
- How do we address Irregular Warfare?
- What are the implications for the Future?
- Conclusion

War is a chameleon



Definitions

- References: JOC 2007; JOE 2008; CCJO 2009
- IW= Population Focus v. CW = Military Focus
- COIN, UW, CT, FID, SSTR
- Supporting Activities: IO, Psyops, Strategic Communication, CMO, Law Enforcement Against Transnational Crime....
- Simultaneous with Conventional Warfare or independent
- Definitely not Irregular and often not War
- -- Cigarette Smuggling in Mali?



Cause

Total War Paradigm- Mechanism is....

Strategic Problem is a balance of Capacity,
 Demand and Time to achieve a solution

 Faction without Capacity changes time and Demand parameters

Mines are the poor man's tank





A Conflict Sine Wave

- Spectrum of Conflict (High, Medium, and Low Intensity= Amplitude)
- Phases of Conflict (Strategic Engagement, Initial Entry, Build up, Decisive Combat Operations, Stability and Reconstruction, Transition= Frequency)
- Conflict is Persistent and Dynamic
 — Mao's
 Protracted Warfare
 - Resource Competition; Trans-National Crime; Population Migration;
 Clashes of Perception

Policy is War by another Means-A corollary

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How do we address Irregular Warfare? A Human Problem

- Information Age Warfare- Alberts et al.
- OODA Loop- Col. John Boyd, USAF
- Emotional Decision Making
- Understanding Intent and Perception/ Apperception—Somalia Story
- Red Teaming (UFMCS)
- Dynamic Social Network Analysis (CADS/ MIT Program)



How do we address Irregular

Warfare? The Counter-Threat Cycle

- Deter
- Detect
- Prevent
- Protect
- Remediate
- Recover


 Requires a System of Systems approach, dynamic and persistent.





Strategic Evolution

- Combined Arms
- Joint
- International
- Inter-Agency
- Comprehensive



Making the Suit Fit the Fight

— We do not draw our boundaries where you draw yours"- USC Representative 1993, Near Baidoa, Somalia

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Conclusion

- tegular Warfare" has always existed and always will
- Managing perception (ours and theirs) is the critical element
- Capacity- Demand- Time Analysis= Get a better fitting suit or change the requirement to wear one



Questions

So Why Should I Care?

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Multi-National Corps Iraq





TF TROY Counter IED Update NDIA Global EOD Conference COL Patrick Kelly

Points of Emphasis

- Criticality of forensics process, specifically biometric match attribution; transfer of capability to ISF while also affecting a paradigm shift in Iraqi Rule of Law
- Balancing shift in focus towards ISF Parternship and Transition while maintaining CF support as critical enabler
- Ensuring access to significant IED and cache events to maximize awareness of emerging threats and enable ISF to conduct C-IED and Technical Intelligence operations
- Mentoring key leaders to develop a cross-ministerial strategy (MOD / MOI / MOJ) to realize a proactive, left of boom C-IED process within the Gov't of Iraq



CJTF Troy Mission Statement

CJTF Troy exercises command and control of specialized Joint Counter-IED and CBRNE forces to neutralize the CBRNE/IED threat; conducts weapons technical intelligence collection and exploitation to defeat IED networks;

assists ISF in building sustainable security capabilities.









Assigned Specialized C-IED forces include:

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

ISF Partnering & Transition LOO cut across all LOOs as Coalition Forces continue the drawdown

Technical Escort (CBRN/CRT)
Targeteers (CITP)

CJTF Troy - Core Capabilities



EOD/IED Defeat



Transfer of C-IED Capability



C-IED Equipment



Chemical/Biological





Training



Weapons Technical Intelligence



IED Tech Intel / Forensics



IED Intelligence Products




Counter IED Process





Transitioning the C-IED Process





Iraqi Explosives Exploitation Initiatives











- Combined Joint Explosives Triage (CJET)
- Explosives eXploitation Iraq Transition (EXIT)





Explosives Exploitation Partnership







Goal: Create an Iraq-led, combined, organic, sustainable, explosives exploitation capability, partnering and sharing information with CF, to defeat a common enemy

- Initial stage: Combined Joint Explosives
 Triage (CJET) late 2009
 - 3 Iraqi Police, 3 Iraqi Army EOD Techs in a 45- day
 Triage apprenticeship program
- Follow-on stage: Explosives eXploitation lraq Transition (EXIT) – early 2010
 - Follow-on training in post-blast, biometrics and chemical exploitation; UK FCO lead
- Desire End State: 2-3 Iraqi explosives exploitation labs established and sustained by new cadre of Iraqi explosives exploitation specialists







Warrant Packages / Testimonial Support

- Sovereign country with end of UN Security Council Resolution and elections







Partnership and Transition











TF Troy Partnering at all Levels





















Tactical Level Engagement



17th IA Division Engineer Regiment
Combined Disposal Operation
Iraqi planned and led
15 July 2009

WIT 2 instructing Mosul IP CET forensics and SSE 11 Jul 2009

WIT 11 teaching Kirkuk IP CET computer based reporting training





Operational Level Engagement

JTF-Troy MND-B Baghdad ISF EOD Commander's Conference

Al Faw Palace - Summer 2009











Strategic Level Engagements









Ministry of Justice Strategic Engagement





Information Sharing Cycle with ISF









Evidence is provided by MOI, MOD EOD forces







Evidence is processed and exploited by TROY CEXC



All products/processes translated into Arabic



Key Points

- Iraqi C-IED capability is critical to the security of Iraq
 - GOI support is critical, for the good of Iraq
 - Coalition can help fill gaps, as Iraq develops, executes strategy
 - Sharing & cooperation between CF and ISF is essential as CF departs Iraq
- Must have coordinated strategic end state (C-IED, forensics, labs)
 - Cooperation between MOI & MOD entities is crucial to effective C-IED strategy
 - Pool resources, plan together, work together, protect Iraq together
- Unity of effort, open lines of communication very important

 Must build effective command and control for EOD, investigations, and exploitation
- Iraq must develop effective C-IED capabilities
 - Defeat the network before the explosions occur
 - Site exploitation, reporting, fusion, analysis = defeat the enemy network

Coalition support to Iraqi-led operations saves Iraqi & Coalition lives – teamwork & cooperation defeats common enemy



ISF & Coalition Cooperation

- Coalition will respect Iraqi sovereignty & Security Agreement
- Coalition encourages the IGFC to:
 - Promote scene access and evidence sharing with CF EOD
 - Continue to grant access to key IED evidence:
 - Post Blast scenes; IED and IED-related material
 - Weapons Cache sites with explosives
 - Strikes against coalition
- Every IED event is a crime scene evidence vital to defeating network
 - Partner with Coalition to prosecute common enemy
 - Ensure Iraqi Army preserves evidence
- Coalition will share information derived from the turn of evidence by the Iraqi Security Forces
 - Tech reports, Intel reports, Safety Notices, Warrant Packages
 - Reports are available in Arabic through Coalition partners

Coalition support to Iraqi-led operations saves Iraqi and Coalition lives – teamwork defeats common enemy

United Kingdom / Australia End of Mission



Questions / Comments














Agenda

- BLUF
- LTG Hertling guidance
- Findings / Targets of Opportunity / Recommendations

"The challenge"

- •Requirements have nearly tripled from 1204 authorizations to 3416.
- •School throughput is 5x what it was in 2003 (from 210 to 1075).
- •Attrition rate has once again doubled to 40%.



BLUF

- We think we can do better...There are ways to maximize graduation #s and reduce attrition.
- We see an opportunity to reduce Army Attrition rates up to 10% by mid CY 11.
- Target attrition rate 30%.



"Holistic" solutions

recommendation off the board!

LTG Hertling VTC comments:

- 1. Look at what we are not doing to prepare soldiers for entering EOD school
- 2. Create a feeling that they are a "select group"
- 3. Prepare them mentally, physically, and technically to successfully complete the course. Tell them what is expected
- 4. What personnel policies are in place setting soldiers up for failure
- 5. Look at discipline attrition at Eglin, Why?
- 6. Look at differences in attrition in phase I and phase II per service
- 7. "Gaming" applications need to be made available.
- 8. Inform the Navy CAPT that the Army is taking this seriously.


Change the nature of EOD phase 1

Currently primarily academics "train the test"



PT heavy Motivational Team-building How vs What to think

EOD Personnel Pipeline



Current Targets of Opportunity / Recommendations

Recruiting / Assessing

- Change General Maintenance (GM) 105 to Skilled Technical (ST) 110
- 2. Other eligibility criteria changes
 - a) Eliminate Time-in-grade
 (TIG) waivers for SGTs
 - b) Remove 2 year active duty requirement
- In Service Recruiting (ISR)
 Organization becomes an enduring capability
- 4. Bombs suit test standardization
- Block Recruiting Operations Center (ROC) waivers
- 6. Basic Training at same location
- 7. Alter Prior Service eligibility
- 8. Continue to "OverTRAP"
- 9. Officer Accessions changes
- 10. New Recruiting Video

Redstone / PH1 EOD

- 1. Incorporating performance psychology
- 2. PRT program re-vamp
- 3. Change in APFT standard?
- 4. Insert team building exercises
- 5. Exchange Test Administrator Guides
- 6. Realignment of EOD training assets
- 7. Reinstate filters
- 8. Seats VS Attrition guidance
- 9. "Gaming" Enablers

Data feedback loop

Eglin/ PH2 EOD

- 1. Address inactive population
- 2. Medical standards adjudication (PB Board 30 Apr)
- 3. CSL BN CMD team
- 4. Success tied to privileges
- 5. Retrain Recycles

Continued involvement with Dr Schneider may yield long term dividends






Global Explosive Ordnance Disposal Road to War Lessons Learned

Colonel Tom Langowski
52d EOD Group
April 30, 2010



Counter-IED Fight






Develop the premier combined, joint, and interagency capability to counter the influence of improvised explosive devices and networks. Enable the migration of Counter-IED capabilities and capacity to all coalition forces and host nation security forces in order to protect the people from insurgent attacks and free them from future threats posed by violent extremist networks.



BCT/EOD Company Fight






- All exploitation and intelligence collected on an IED event begins with defeating the device; EOD core competencies need to maintain that capability
- To effectively begin attacking the network requires the integration of all the MEANS available; the EOD Company leadership is often times that SME at the BCT
- Training the force requires a thorough working knowledge of red and blue TTPs



Division/EOD Battalion Fight






- Plan and employ the intelligence cycle to defeat the IED system
- Fuse exploitation products with other intelligence sources
- Analyze adversary IED Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
- Analyze and recommend Electronic Warfare operations against the IED system
- Conduct mission planning in an IED environment



Corps/EOD Group Fight





- Integrate C-IED enablers and capabilities in the Afghanistan Theater
- · Plan and employ the intelligence cycle to defeat the IED system
- Fuse exploitation products with other intelligence sources
- Identify and analyze enemy and friendly IED TTP patterns and protect the force
- Conduct analytical exploitation of IED events and provide timely feedback



The EOD Memorial FOUNDATION













The Mission

- with admiration, recognize, support, and appropriately honor members of the EOD family that have been killed while performing their assigned duties.
- with compassion, recognize, honor, and support the family members of our fallen EOD Warriors.
- with enthusiasm and pride, strive to increase the awareness, appreciation, and professionalism of the EOD vocation.



Moving Forward



 with enthusiasm and pride, strive to increase the awareness, appreciation, and professionalism of the EOD vocation.

- > Shift to a more proactive and "outreach" oriented mindset
- ➤ Continue to recruit high level Board of Directors, Advisors, Committee leadership/members, and volunteer support
- ➤ Incorporate an efficient communication process to the EOD, DoD, Non-DoD, and lay communities



The EOD Memorial

Awareness:

- Aggressive promotion of the profession
- National level outreach and availability to media and other PR resources
- Brand development
- Involve affinity associations for public presentations and fund raisers













Appreciation:

- Recruit and develop a Legacy Committee
- Incorporate support ideas and programs based upon Legacy input
- Develop as a resource for EOD commands and families





Identify synergy partners





Moving Forward

Professionalism:

- Conferences and Workshops
- > Influence Committee



- ➤ Advisory Committee for the Foundation
- Professional Association Involvement





Moving Forward


Help Wanted:

- > Involvement:
 - Committee participation/leadership
 - Board of Director Interest
 - Communication of ideas
 - Identify awareness opportunities
- Funding Support (Non-Gov)
 - Direct donations & sponsorships
 - CFC awareness
 - Fund-raisers
 - Endowment support



We appreciate your support and service

But the bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet notwithstanding, go out to meet it. --Thucydides





Interagency Combating Terrorism Technology Support



Gabe Ramos, Deputy Director, Technology Division 28 April 2010



Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office

Vision:

Identify requirements to combat terrorism and provide solutions to warfighters, first responders, and other front-line users as rapidly as possible.

Mission:

Identify and prioritize the needs of the interagency community charged with combating terrorism. Deliver capabilities to those on the front lines through rapid research, development, test, evaluation, and operational support. Incorporate available expertise and experience from government, commercial, private, and academic sources throughout the United States and the world.

Objectives:

- Provide interagency forum to coordinate R&D requirements for combating terrorism
- Sponsor interagency advanced technology development
- Promulgate technology & information transfer
- Influence policy development
- Guide basic and applied research



CTTSO Organization



Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities



Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office



Department of State



Technical Support Working Group



Explosive Ordnance
Disposal/Low-Intensity Conflict



Irregular Warfare Support



Human, Social, Cultural, & Behavior Modeling



TSWG Organization







TSWG Mission

• Mission: Conduct the U.S. national interagency research and development program for Combating Terrorism through rapid research, development, and prototyping.

• Objectives:

- Provide interagency forum to coordinate R&D requirements for combating terrorism
- Sponsor R&D not addressed by individual agencies
- Promote information transfer



Interagency Partnership



Department of Defense

OASD(SO/LIC)
OATSD(NCB)CP/CBD

OUSD(A&T) DDR&E and S&TS/LW

Armed Forces Institute of Pathology

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory

Defense Intelligence Agency

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Joint IED Defeat Task Force

National Security Agency

Pentagon Force Protection Agency

Polygraph Institute

The Joint Staff

Unified Commands

US Special Operations Command

US Air Force

Air Combat Command Air Force Research Lab Electronic Systems Center AFOSI

US Army

52nd ORD

SBCCOM / ECBC

Corps of Engineers / ERDC / PMDC Criminal Investigations Command

Natick RDE Center

20th Support Command (CBRNE)

Training and Doctrine Command

National Guard Bureau

US Navy

Naval Criminal Investigative Service Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center

Naval Special Warfare NEODTD / DTRG **US Marine Corps**

Chemical Biological Incident Response Force Network Operations & Security Command

Department of State

Bureau of Diplomatic Security Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Overseas Building Operations

Department of Agriculture

Agricultural Research Service Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Food Safety and Inspection Service Office of the Inspector General

Department of Energy

National Nuclear Security Administration
Office of Energy Assurance
Office of Security

Department of Health and Human Services/USPHS

Centers for Disease Control & Prevention Food & Drug Administration National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

Department of Homeland Security

Border and Transportation Security
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Office for Domestic Preparedness
Emergency Preparedness &
Response
Transportation Security Agency

Science and Technology
US Coast Guard
US Secret Service

Department of Commerce

National Institute of Standards and Technology
Office of Law Enforcement Standards

Department of Justice

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

Drug Enforcement Administration Federal Bureau of Investigation

Federal Bureau of Prisons National Institute of Justice Office of Justice Programs US Marshals Service

Department of Transportation

Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Transit Administration
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center

Department of the Treasury

Federal Reserve Board


Independent Agencies

US Supreme Court Police

Environmental Protection Agency
General Services Administration
Intelligence Community
Interagency Board
National Virtual Translation Center
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
State and Local Agencies
Supreme Court of the United States
US Capital Police
US Postal Inspection Service
US Senate Sergeant at Arms




Business Cycle






B.I.D.S. – www.bids.tswg.gov





CTTSO Performers

















New Zealand







Australia

Canada

France


Germany

Israel

Singapore Switzerland



Technology Readiness Levels






Technology Transition

- Objective: Affordable, operationally suitable technology in the hands of our users
- An integral part of TSWG process
 - Begins with the proposal
 - Continues throughout development
 - Requires periodic deliverables
- Prepares for the unexpected
- Planning assistance provided by TSWG/CTTSO
- Accelerates prototype to product cycle



TSWG Project Highlights



HME Precursor Detection Kit




Car Scan –
Dual Energy Low Dose X-Ray




Hardened Trace Explosives
Detector



Single-Sided X-Ray





Graphical Training Aids



TSWG Project Highlights



Forward Fighting Positions



Digital Observation Guard



Urban Canyon



Personal Hydration System Water Filter



Tactical Glove



FIVAK



TSWG Project Highlights




X800/X400 Through-Wall Imaging



Vapor Wake Canines



Improved Laser/Light Aiming Device



HSCB - S-CAT Decision aid



CTTSO Conferences/Workshops

Explosives Detection 2009 Symposium and Workshop October 20-23 | San Diego, CA







Homeland Security Presidential Directive -19 (HSPD-19)

HSPD-19 establishes a national policy and calls for the development of a strategy to prevent, detect, and respond to terrorist's use of explosives in the United States. The HSPD-19 Implementation Plan mandates the creation of an interagency working group for counter-IED technologies in the science and technology field.

CTTSO co-chairs the Domestic Counter-Improvised Explosives Devices (IED) Working Group under the White House National Science and Technology Council Committee on Homeland and National Security.

The working group is conducting a government-wide inventory of R&D efforts to identify responder requirements from CONUS based counter-IED agencies.

The working group will then analyze needs against capabilities and produce a gap analysis for interagency coordination of research, development, test and evaluation to address the technology gaps.






Homeland Security Presidential Directive -22 (HSPD-22)

The HSPD-22 establishes a national policy to strengthen the United States' ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from toxic chemical terrorist attacks and chemical incidents. CTTSO/TSWG coordinated with agency heads to deliver a National Research and Development Plan for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

HSPD-22 launches a strategy for focused R&D in chemical PPE to address the utility and availability of PPE for chemical incident response.

The plan recommends objectives to establish a coordinated partnership with standards-setting organizations, industry representatives, and professional organizations that improves the level of **protection**, **utility**, and **availability** of high quality chemical PPE.



The White House approved the plan in January 2009. The implementation plan is under development with the White House Homeland Security Council and has the potential to garner additional focused research and funding in the chemical PPE arena.



Summary

- Forum to Identify, Prioritize, Resolve, and Fund Operational Needs/Requirements
- Driven by Interagency User Elements
- Acquisition / Dual Use / Commercialization
- Fast Track and Flexible Program Forum



Contact Information

Gabe Ramos
Deputy Director Technical Programs
Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office
ramosg@tswg.gov



Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Force Update



29 APRIL 2010 CDR Gene Rathgeber Chief Staff Officer EOD GROUP ONE

UNCLASSIFIED



Overview

- Core Mission Areas
- Who We Are
- Operational Force Lay Down
- Units of Action
- Enlisted Accession / Retention
- Key EOD Force Initiatives
- Statistics and Highlights
- Where Industry can Help
- Questions





Core Mission Areas



Explosive Ordnance Disposal

- Conventional, Chem, Bio, Nuke, U/W, IED, WMD
- Remove hazards / Enable Access on land and from sea

Naval Expeditionary Combat Ops

- WMD, IED, UXO, Mines
- NECC / NAVEXPEDRIVFOR
- Marine Mammal Systems / Unmanned Systems
- U.S. Secret Service and DOS VIP protection

Underwater Mine Countermeasures

- Organic, Dedicated UMCM
- Naval Special Clearance Team
- Marine Mammal Systems/Unmanned Systems

Expeditionary Diving / Salvage

• MDSU ONE/TWO.....rapid deployment





Who We Work With





Conventional Forces

• Blue: CSG, ESG, MCMRONs, USCG

• Green: USMC

• SOF

- Army Special Forces
- Navyy Seals

Other

- DTRA
- USSS
- Inter-Agency (HMA, JTF-FA)

•Theater Engagement


• Significant multi-national engagement

UNCLASSIFIED




Operational Forces

Low Supply / High Demand






Tactical Unit Of Action MOBILE Company/Platoon Structure






Tactical Unit Of Action SOF Company Structure





Tactical Unit Of Action Mine Counter Measures Platoon





Enlisted Accessions and Retention

Accessions Requirement

- FY10 Total Accession goal is 383 to meet 135 graduates
- From Accession to Fleet is a Minimum of 85 weeks
- Projected manning in FY 12 85% of requirement

Retention

- -Force Shaping tools
 - Selective Re-enlistment Bonus (SRB)
 - Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB)
 - Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP)



Key EOD Force Initiatives

Improving Health of the Force

- Implement (4:1 FRTP)
 - At best, current FRTP is 3:1 with mitigations in place
 - Potentially growing 8 additional EOD Platoons
 - Will increase 5337 qualification rate
- Implemented 12 week Training for PLTS
 - Advanced focused training increases readiness



Statistics and Highlights

- Over 3500 Combat Missions in 2009
 - -Over 400 Combat Awards
 - -2 Silver Stars
 - **–42 Purple Hearts**
- Navy EOD supporting the Surge in OEF
 - –EOD GROUP (Task Force Troy)
 - -Platoons
 - Battalion
- High Demand Low Density Asset
 - One of the highest OPTEMPO's in U.S. Navy



Where We Need Your Help?

Unmanned Systems

- UUV/UAV/Ground Robotics communications enhancement
- Underwater vehicle sensor and neutralization technology
- Energy Efficiency
- Ground Robotics advancements
 - Reduce time-on-target
 - Light weight systems for agile, dismounted ops without capability loss
 - Enhance manipulation capability
 - Extend operation life with advancements in power generation/supply

Personnel Protection

- Ultra light and agile body armor
- Next generation bomb suit technology







Where We Need Your Help? Continued

Standoff Detection and Disruption

- Determine the threat before going into harms way
- Enhance survivability
- Defeat the Network*
- Spectrum of Effects: Non-kinetic, low-order, high-order neutralization

Forensics

- Radiographic systems
- Post Blast investigation
- Wireless transmission/reception*





Today's Knights may wear a different suit of armor...but they have the same Honor, Courage and Commitment



Headquarters U.S. Air Force

Integrity - Service - Excellence

USAF EOD State of the Service Brief





Lt Col Richter A7CXR



Overview

- USAF EOD Program
 - "Who We Are"
 - "Where We Are"
 - "What We've Done"
- Challenges
- Successes
- Remembering
- Questions





AFPD 32-30 EOD Program

- Governing policy directive for AF EOD program
- Organized as EOD flights under the Civil Engineer Squadron
 - Follows the typical AF Wing, Group, Squadron and Flight structure
- Nine primary mission areas:
 - Aerospace Platform response (combat, cargo, and Space Launch Vehicles)
 - Force Protection
 - WMD response
 - Nuclear
 - UXO response
 - Range Clearance
 - Port Mortuary
 - Support to Civil Authorities/VIPPSA
 - Training



Explosive Ordnance Disposal Who We Are

- One of the most stressed career fields
- Maintain ~ 230 specialized equip UTCs
- Deployed and sustain ~ 100 theater UTCs
- Primary missions
 - Support combat aircraft sortie generation, nuclear stockpile, aerial ports and force protection



- Secondary missions
 - Provide EOD tactical and operational expertise to joint force/SOF and partnering nations
- Improvised Explosive Device growth as weapon of choice for insurgents has increased demand for EOD
- Irregular Warfare and Counter-Insurgency conflicts have highlighted shortage of CIED enablers
- Joint Force Doctrine changing to reflect expanding EOD/CIED requirements



Explosive Ordnance Disposal Where We Are


- 74 CONUS/OCONUS bases (total force)
 - Five flights supporting **EUCOM** Commander priorities
 - Eight flights supporting PACOM Commander priorities
- CENTCOM: ~ 33 locations in Afghanistan/Iraq, 5 locations outside
 - ~ 130 deployed in Afghanistan
 - Largest presence in RC-S with almost 75% of EOD force
 - Over 50% of EOD force in theater the last two years
 - ~ 110 deployed in Iraq
 - Significant reduction expected by end of year
 - ~ 30 at Air Expeditionary Wings (AEW) and Groups (AEG) outside combat theater



EOD Operations OEF/OIF (1 Jan 09 - Pres) What We've Done

- Missions Consists of:
 - Improvised Explosive Device
 - Route Clearance
 - Cache
 - Post Blast
 - Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)
 - Enemy Attack
 - Explosive Remnants of War






Information derived from various sources



EOD Operations (1 Jan 09 - Pres) What We've Done Outside Theater

- Nine Mission Areas
 - Aircraft response
 - Force Protection
 - WMD response
 - Nuclear
 - UXO response
 - Range Clearance
 - Port Mortuary
 - Support to Civil Authorities/VIPPSA
 - Training



Information derived from USAF EOD Information Management System



USAF EOD Challenges

NAVSCOLEOD Attrition

- Emotion Quotient Inventory (EQ-i)
- Moving Prelim course from Lackland AFB to Sheppard AFB
- Physical Assessment Skills Test
- 2AF considering placement of EOD accessions in newly developed Battlefield Airman BMTS

Retention

- Increased Promotions--chronic critical skills plus-ups
- Increased Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB)
- Special Duty Assignment Incentive Pay (SDAP)
- 1299 auth 970 assigned (75%)... {56 women assigned ~4%}
- Nuclear Support and Global Strike Command
- Balancing Home Station Support with Deployed JFC Support



USAF EOD Successes

- Combat Battlefield Ready Airman Course
- Contract Technical Support
- MRAP and M-ATV Fielding
 - 105 MRAP CAT I and II fielded since Jan 08 (AF EOD Variant)
 - 48 M-ATV being fielded with CROWS II
- Joint Robotics Repair Facility
- Transformation
 - Incorporating in CE Doctrine
 - EOD Vision 2020





TSgt Walter M. Moss Jr. 29 March 2006 Baghdad, Iraq

Capt Kermit O. Evans

3 December 2006

Baghdad, Iraq

SrA Daniel B. Miller Jr.

7 January 2007

Baghdad, Iraq



MSgt Brad A. Clemmons 21 August 2006



Taji, Iraq

TSgt Timothy R.



Weiner
7 January 2007
Baghdad, Iraq



SrA Elizabeth A. Loncki **7 January 2007**



SrA William N. Newman 7 June 2007 Balad, Iraq



TSgt Anthony L. Capra 9 April 2008 Balad, Iraq



TSgt Phillip A. Myers 4 April 2009 Bastion, Afghanistan



SSgt Bryan D. Berky 12 September 2009 Farah, Afghanistan



926 3985-M757

RGE ASSEMBLY DEMOLITION

DMP C-4

LOT LOP

Baghdad, Iraq



TSgt Anthony C. Campbell 15 December 2009 Helmand, Afghanistan



TSgt Adam K. Ginett 19 January 2010 Kuhak, Afghanistan



Questions





United States Marine Corps Explosive Ordnance Disposal



LtCol Marc Tarter



EOD Mission



To support Marine operating forces, national security strategy, and force protection by locating, accessing, identifying, rendering safe, neutralizing, and disposing of hazards from foreign and domestic, conventional, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (**CBRNE**), unexploded explosive ordnance (**UXO**), improvised explosive devices (**IEDs**), and weapons of mass destruction (**WMD**) that present a threat to operations, installations, personnel, or materiel. (MCRP 3-17.2C)

Note: USMC EOD units are authorized to conduct field disassembly and inerting operations for the purpose of exploitation and intelligence gathering.



MAGTF 101



• Marine Corps deploys expeditionary forces that fight on a combined arms concept. These forces are called Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF'S).


MAGTF Composition

- Command Element
- Ground Combat Element
- Air Combat Element
- Logistics Combat Element



Current I & II MEF EOD T/O








Current III MEF EOD T/O







EOD Company Standup



 EOD Company activated within in each MLG - 1 Oct 2009.

CAMP LEATHERNECK, Afghanistan-Capt. Timothy M. Callahan, Commanding Officer of EOD Company unfurls the company guidon.





Company Concept of Employment




- EOD Company Concept of employment:
 - Organized to provide command and control for EOD operations in support of the MAGTF.
- Structure
 - EOD Company:
 - Each Platoon manned and equipped IOT support a Regiment not conducting Distributed Operations (DO).
 - Two Platoons (or more) are required for a Regiment conducting DO.
 - EOD Platoon:
 - Three sections per Platoon
 - Each section manned and equipped IOT support a Battalion non-DO.
 - Two sections (or more) are required for a Battalion conducting DO.
- Based on mission requirements, EOD section can be reinforced or divided into taskorganized response elements



Proposed EOD Company I, II and III MLG with 202K CAR increase





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EOD Base / Station Missions



- Base/Station EOD teams are tasked with the full spectrum of Force Protection / Anti-Terrorism / Homeland Defense missions
 - 24 hr Emergency IED/WMD/UXO/Crash response.
 - On & off Base
 - 1st Responder Agreements w/ local municipalities
 - Routine base support








Other EOD Missions







- FBI
- ATF
- TSA
- USSS
- State and Local agencies
- Technical Support
 - Other Agencies





















MARSOC EOD



- EOD is organic to MARSOC
- Supports all missions;
 - Direct Action (DA)
 - Special Reconnaissance (SR)
 - Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
 - Counterterrorism (CT)
 - Unconventional Warfare (UW)
- Two -Four EOD personnel deployed per MSOC, plus CJSOTF requirements





Current EOD Support Operations




- Afghanistan (Over 100 EOD personnel per rotation)
- Iraq (Task Force Troy CEXC)
- Seven standing MEUs (1/8 EOD personnel per MEU)
- Continuous VIPPSA missions (POTUS, DOS, etc.)
- Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC)



Locations








Locations (Cont)








EOD Manpower Increases



• EOD strength increased several times since 2004 (FSRG 2004, MARSOC, and 202K Grow the Force)



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Requirements to become an EOD Technician



- Must be a Cpl or Sgt. (Not selected for SSgt)
- 21 Years of age.
- GT score of 110 or above.
- Physically Fit (1st Class PFT / CFT)
- Bomb Suit Agility Test
- Be eligible for a security clearance based on an SSBI.
- Be interviewed, screened and recommended by a Marine Corps EOD SNCO & Officer.
- For complete list of requirements see MCO 3571.2_





Who we have (Enlisted)



- Sgt MGySgt.
- Cpl's promoted to Sgt w/ minimum TIG (Normally at School)







Who we have (Officer)



- LDO Capt LtCol
- WO CWO5
- <u>All</u> officers were enlisted EOD
 Technicians
- No Unrestricted
 Officers



















Initiatives impacting EOD



- Company growth
- Pacific lay down
 - •Guam
 - •Okinawa
 - •Hawaii
- MARFORSOC (EOD growth)
- Advanced USMC EOD Training Center







Questions



04/29/10